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NOTE
NONDELEGATION AFTER MISTRETTA: PHOENIX OR
PHAETHON?
Even as the media and academicians alike acknowledge the as-
cent of the conservative wing to majority status on the United
States Supreme Court,' a puzzling anomaly exists. Decisions dur-
ing the last three terms2 reveal a retreat from the formalist ap-
proach 3 that had governed the Court's separation of powers juris-
prudence from approximately 1976 to 1988. The Court's seeming
departure from this approach, once considered de rigueur among
conservative jurists, is perplexing as it has coincided with the as-
cendency of the court's conservative wing. Since the appointments
1. The conservative coalition includes Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Justice Byron
R. White and the three Reagan appointees: Justices Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia
and Sandra Day O'Connor. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARv.
L. REV. 44, 44-45 (1989) ("Joining Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor,
and Scalia, Justice Kennedy supplied the critical fifth vote in a series of conservative 5-4
decisions .... "); L. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, Remarks at the Les-
lie H. Arps Lecture Before The Association of the Bar of the City of New York 2 (October
17, 1989) ("At the close of the 1988 Term, commentators who agreed on little else unani-
mously proclaimed a 'shift in direction' on the Court."). But cf. Rotunda, The Confirmation
Process for Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L.J. 559, 563 (1988)
("Sandra Day O'Connor was supposed to be a right wing idealogue; now the news media and
many commentators regard her as a moderate.") (footnote omitted).
2. See Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (an 8-1 decision upholding the
constitutionality of sentencing guidelines); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988) (a 7-1
decision upholding the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics
in Government Act).
3. Formalism seeks to keep one branch from exercising or controlling another branch's
power. It employs a two-step inquiry, asking first which branch exercises the power in ques-
tion and second, what kind of power is being exercised, executive, legislative or judicial. If
the answers to both questions are not the same, the separation of powers doctrine has been
violated. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
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of Justices Antonin Scalia4 and Anthony M. Kennedy, this more
conservative Court has released two major separation of powers de-
cisions, Morrison v. Olson5 and Mistretta v. United States, each
fervently espousing a more flexible, so-called "functionalist"
approach.
7
If the decisions mark the demise of the formalist school under
the ironic circumstances described above, they also signal the end
of the nondelegation doctrine's8 period of "renewed respectabil-
4. The Court decided Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the last major case reflecting
the strict formalist or separation view, in June 1986, two and a half months before Scalia
joined the Court.
5. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988). Justice Kennedy did not participate in the Morrison decision.
6. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
7. Functionalism is a more pragmatic approach than formalism. It employs a two-step
analysis that focuses on whether the power of one branch has been encroached upon, and if
so, whether that power has been aggrandized by another branch. See infra notes 24-25, 121
and accompanying text.
The Court's apparent shift from a formalist to a functionalist approach did not go unno-
ticed. See, e.g., Greenhouse, Justices Uphold Disputed System of U.S. Sentencing, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
The [Mistretta] decision was in the spirit of the Court's ruling last summer [in
Morrison] that Congress did not violate the separation of powers by creating
the office of special prosecutor to investigate executive branch wrongdoing.
Taken together, the two decisions appear to mark a shift away from the for-
mal approach to the issue that had earlier led the Court to strike down the
initial version of the budget-balancing law [in Bowsher] in 1986.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 682 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted):
Today's decision follows the regrettable tendency of our recent separation-of-
powers jurisprudence to treat the Constitution as though it were no more than
a generalized prescription that the functions of the Branches should not be
commingled too much-how much is too much to be determined, case-by-case,
by this Court.
Some commentators did not see such a clear shift to a functionalist approach. See
Werhan, Toward an Eclectic Approach to Separation of Powers; Morrison v. Olson Ex-
amined, 16 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 393 (1989) (arguing that in Morrison, the Court applied an
eclectic merger of the formalist and functionalist approaches); Comment, Separation Of
Powers and the Independent Governmental Entity After Mistretta v. United States, 50 LA.
L. REv. 117 (1989) (arguing that in Mistretta, the Court actually employed a combination of
the formalist and functionalist approaches).
8. The nondelegation doctrine postulates that Congress cannot delegate its legislative
powers to the other branches. Congress may make exceptions, however, when it needs the
assistance of other branches to perform its own duties. See infra notes 33-51 and accompa-
nying text.
The Supreme Court intended the doctrine to serve three important functions:
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ity." Although fifty-five years have passed since the nondelegation
doctrine commanded a majority of the Court,10 and the institution-
alization of administrative agencies over that period suggested that
the doctrine had become a dead letter,11 the landmark nondelega-
tion case, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,"2 remains
good law. Indeed, signs from the Supreme Court just prior to Mor-
rison and Mistretta suggested that the doctrine was not quite as
"moribund"' 3 as some believed. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia had indicated receptiveness to the doctrine's revi-
val, 4 as had numerous legal commentators. 5 Such interest, along
First, . . . it ensures to the extent consistent with orderly governmental ad-
ministration that important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the
branch of our Government most responsive to the popular will. Second, the
doctrine guarantees that, to the extent Congress finds it necessary to delegate
authority, it provides the recipient of that authority with an "intelligible prin-
ciple" to guide the exercise of the delegated discretion. Third . . .the doctrine
ensures that courts charged with reviewing the exercise of delegated legislative
discretion will be able to test that exercise against ascertainable standards.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685-86 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
9. Scalia, A Note on the Benzene Case, REG., July-Aug. 1980, at 25, 27; see Aranson,
Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 67 (1982)
("T]he idea of a change in constitutional rules governing legislative delegations has ac-
quired a fresh dignity."); see also infra text accompanying notes 65-97.
10. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama Refining
Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). But cf. infra note 51 and accompanying text.
11. In a 1974 concurrence joined by Justice Brennan in Federal Power Comm'n v. New
England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974), Justice Marshall maintained that the doctrine "has
been virtually abandoned by the Court for all practical purposes . . . .This doctrine is
surely as moribund as the substantive due process approach of the same era. . . if not more
so." Id. at 352-53 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In 1982, commentators de-
scribed the nondelegation doctrine as "continu[ing] to live a fugitive existence at the edge of
constitutional jurisprudence," Aranson, Gelihorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 17, and as
being "abandoned and ... a failure." K. DAvIs, SUPPLEMENT TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
TISE 18 (1982).
12. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
13. See supra note 11.
14. For Chief Justice Rehnquist's views, see American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452
U.S. 490, 547-48 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting) and Industrial Union
Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
For Justice Scalia's views, see Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 675-83 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2622-41 (1988) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting); Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1384 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Scalia, supra note 9; Scalia, The Legislative Veto: A False
Remedy for System Overload, REG., Nov.-Dec. 1979, at 19 [hereinafter Scalia, Legislative
Veto].
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with growing frustration with administrative agencies, 16 and the
apparent vigor of a strict separation approach suggested that the
doctrine's revival might not prompt "[t]he biggest horse laugh" 17
after all.
Mistretta and Morrison signal an abrupt end to this recent rise
in the doctrine's credibility.' 8 That the fall of the formalist ap-
15. For commentaries arguing the merits of revival, see T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM
IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY 297-99 (1st ed. 1969); Freedman,
Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHr. L. REV. 307 (1976); Gewirtz,
The Courts, Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, 40 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1976, at 46, 49-65; Jaffe, An Essay on Delegation of Legislative
Power (pts. 1&2), 47 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 561-93 (1947); Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liber-
alism, Conservatism and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 295 (1987); Merrill, Stan-
dards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NEB. L. REV. 469 (1968);
Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The Constitutional Purposes
of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 355 (1987) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Separa-
tion of Powers]; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?,
83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine]; Wright,
Beyond Discretionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-87 (1972). But cf. K. DAVIS, ADMImS-
TRATIvE LAW TREATISE § 3:2-:3 (2d ed. 1978); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.8 (2d
ed. 1984); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 65-67; Fuchs, Introduction: Ad-
ministrative Agencies and the Energy Problem, 47 IND. L.J. 606, 622-23 (1972); Nathanson,
Separation of Powers and Administrative Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the
"Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064, 1064-78 (1981); Pierce, Jr., Political Ac-
countability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 391
(1987); Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 323 (1987) [hereinafter
Stewart, Beyond Delegation]; Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1693-97 (1975) [hereinafter Stewart, American Administrative Law].
16. See Goldsmith, INS v. Chadha and the Nondelegation Doctrine: A Speculation, 35
SYRACUSE L. REV. 749, 757 (1984); Lowi, supra note 15, at 304-06; Scalia, Legislative Veto,
supra note 14, at 26; Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1226, 1244-45;
Stewart, Beyond Delegation, supra note 15, at 324, 328-29; Taylor, Jr., A Question of
Power, a Powerful Questioner, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3 (discussing then-
Attorney General Meese's view that the entire system of independent agencies might be
unconstitutional); see infra text accompanying notes 70-73.
17. Lowi, supra note 15, at 298 ("The biggest horse laugh was given to the idea of consid-
ering the revival of the Schechter rule."). One commentator went so far as to say that "[i]n
urging the delegation doctrine, I fear being perceived as antisocial, if not lacking in practical
sense .... ." Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 357.
18. The Court's most recent nondelegation decision, Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline
Co., 109 S. Ct 1726 (1989), confirms this finding. Significantly, a unanimous Court was un-
moved by the fact that the delegation to the executive branch was allegedly of Congress'
taxing power. Article I, § 8 of the Constitution explicitly grants this power to Congress, and
presumably to Congress alone. Yet the Court held that "the delegation of discretionary au-
thority under Congress' taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than
that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges." Id. at 1733. In its unanimous re-
buke of a seemingly strong nondelegation argument, given explicit textual commitment of
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proach would have a corresponding impact on the nondelegation
doctrine should come as no surprise. If one understands the for-
malist approach as arguing for a strict separation of the three
branches, with intermingling only as prescribed by the Constitu-
tion,19 the nondelegation doctrine and its admonitions against
shared powers is consistent with that view.
This Note argues that the resulting set-back for the nondelega-
tion doctrine is ill-advised. It reviews the history of the doctrine
and focuses on plausible explanations for the Court's current shift.
The Note then explains the need for the doctrine's revival and of-
fers a practically and philosophically sound version of nondelega-
tion to guide the courts. Specifically, the Note proposes a limited
invocation of the doctrine's intelligible principle standard and the
use of strict scrutiny review in cases involving fundamental liberty
interests.
FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM DEFINED
The formalist approach to separation of powers is characterized
by adherence to a strict interpretation of the Constitution and the
intent of the framers20 and a concomitant disdain for perceived ex-
tra-constitutional improvements. 21 This view of separation of pow-
ers was predominant in the Supreme Court from 1976 to 1988.22
the taxing power to Congress, Mid-America substantiates claims of the doctrine's fall from
grace.
19. See Bruff, On the Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.L. REV.
491, 505 (1987) ("Formalism minimizes the sharing of power by the branches .... When
the Court perceives aggrandizement, it issues a formalist opinion insisting on the separation
of powers.").
20. See, e.g., Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2641 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I prefer to rely upon
the judgment of the wise men who constructed our system, and of the people who approved
it, and of two centuries of history that have shown it to be sound.").
21. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("[T]he fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, stand-
ing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution."); see also Sunstein, Constitu-
tionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REV. 421, 493 (1987) ("Formalist decisions are
premised on the beliefs that the text of the Constitution and the intent of its drafters are
controlling and sometimes dispositive, that changed circumstances are irrelevant to consti-
tutional outcomes, and that broader 'policy' concerns should not play a role in legal
decisions.").
22. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Congress may not exercise removal
power over officers performing executive functions.); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 919 (Congress may
not control the execution of laws except through strict adherence to Article I procedures.);
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The decisions during that period relied on constitutional text and
framers' intent as polestars. One commentator has argued that
"[c]hanged circumstances and even underlying considerations of
constitutional structure were largely ignored." 3
Viewed as "[t]he alternative to formalism, '24 functionalism re-
jects precedent and rules as guides to judicial decisions, relying in-
stead on the facts of each case to determine the outcome. In the
separation of powers context, "[b]ecause a functional analysis is a
fact intensive examination of the system of checks controlling an
individual entity made with little regard for the three part delinea-
tion of power provided in the Constitution, the approach is neces-
sarily ad hoc to a certain extent."25
Professor Sargentich has further demarcated the parameters of
the formalist/functionalist debate, identifying three competing ide-
als most often employed by the two schools of thought.26 The pri-
mary ideal advanced by formalists is the "Rule of Law." The basic
tenet of the Rule of Law ideal is that governmental power is
granted and constrained by legal norms articulated in the Consti-
tution and statutes. Functionalists assail this ideal as impractical
and unrealistic.
Northern Pipe Line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982) (Congress
may not confer Article III powers on Article I judges.); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
(Because appointment of Federal Election Commission members did not follow the guide-
lines of the appointments clause, the Commission could not constitutionally exercise those
powers reserved for "Officers of the United States" appointed in conformity with the
clause.).
23. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 493. For a discussion of the formalist evolution during this
period, see id. ("The last few years have seen a sharp rise of 'constitutional formalism' in
cases involving the separation of powers."); Note, Incorporation of Independent Agencies
into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766, 1775 (1985) ("In recent cases, the Supreme
Court has espoused a new formalism that rejects the functionalist tenets of flexibility, prac-
ticality, and reluctance to enforce the doctrine of separation of powers based on isolated
parts of the Constitution.").
24. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 495.
25. Comment, supra note 7, at 136; see Bruff, supra note 19, at 495-96 ("Functionalism
therefore tends to roam further from the constitutional text than does formalism.").
26. See Sargentich, The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative
Process, 36 AM. U.L. REv. 419 (1987).
27. Sargentich explains:
For many functionalist critics, the chief problems with the legal formalism in
forming a rule of law vision derive from the fact that it is awfully abstract and
removed from the actual operation of law in everyday institutional life. The
1052
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According to Sargentich, the functionalist relies instead on one
or both of the major alternative ideals of administration: the Pub-
lic Purposes ideal or the Democratic Process ideal. The thrust of
the former "is to view agencies, not in terms of any particular pol-
icy framework, but generally as rational managers in pursuit of
public values encoded in statutes."28 This theory underlies eco-
nomic analysis, especially cost-benefit analysis. The Democratic
Process ideal views the governmental system not as an efficient
system, but as a system of inherent competing interests that, "at
its best, can lead to democratically responsive decisions."2 9
The functionalist, by focusing solely on practicalities, "gradually
narrows the debate to one about the method of decisionmaking by
legal actors" and claims the pragmatic high ground, avoiding for-
malism's most important point, the focus on values rather than
methods.3 0 Formalism's value choice is this: "[A]s a matter of legit-
imacy in a liberal state, one cannot escape the rule of law no mat-
ter how problematical its embrace may be."'" Functionalism im-
plicitly recognizes this value, but views it as limited by certain
practicalities.2
THE HISTORY OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
Phase 1-The Rise and the Fall
Originally, the nondelegation doctrine was a pure manifestation
of the Lockean social contract theory:
The power of the Legislative being derived from the People by a
positive voluntary Grant and Institution, can be no other, than
what the positive Grant conveyed, which being only to make
Laws, and not to make Legislators, the Legislative can have no
difficulty is not that a rule of law approach has no theoretical appeal. Rather,
it is that, as a pure notion, the formalist program is not seen to be practical.
Id. at 428.
28. Id. at 433.
29. Id. at 436.
30. Id. at 439-40.
31. Id. at 440.
32. Id. at 428.
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power to transfer their Authority of making Laws, and place it
in other hands."
The courts embraced this traditional notion from the late nine-
teenth through the early twentieth century. Typical of nondelega-
tion decisions was Field v. Clark,s4 in which the first Justice
Harlan maintained, "That Congress cannot delegate legislative
power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital
to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government or-
dained by the Constitution. 3 5 Surprisingly, however, even as far
removed as the American Government of 1892 was from the myr-
iad complexities of modern legislation, courts were sympathetic to
the legislature's need to delegate some of its workload to other
branches. In Clark, Justice Harlan acknowledged that "[t]here are
many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend
which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must,
therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside of the
halls of legislation."3' The courts thus revealed an initial willing-
ness to permit some degree of delegation to facilitate the workings
of Congress.3
33. J. LocKs, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (P. Laslett 2d ed. reprinted with
amend. 1988) (emphasis added); see Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 Am. U.L.
REV. 345, 347-48 (1987) (explaining that the legislature's authority to delegate is limited
because the people have relinquished their most important power only to representatives
they have chosen); Stewart, American Administrative Law, supra note 15, at 1694.
34. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
35. Id. at 692; see United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85
(1932) ("That the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated is, of course, clear.");
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1825) ("It will not be contended that Congress can
delegate to the Courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively
legislative.").
36. Clark, 143 U.S. at 694.
37. The necessity argument emerged as the foremost rationale for more permissive dele-
gations and became the thread linking all decisions permitting such delegations. Gradually,
the perceived necessities were painted increasingly larger in order to rationalize broader
delegations. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654-55 (1989); United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); American Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944); Opp
Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941); Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v.
Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,
552 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring). Notably, this necessity argument also forms the basis
for functionalist separation of powers analysis.
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In Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,38 the Court conveyed the prag-
matic view that the legislature often would need to delegate some
functions, particularly as the federal government expanded in both
size and complexity:
Undoubtedly legislation must often be adapted to complex con-
ditions involving a host of details with which the national legis-
lature cannot deal directly. The Constitution has never been re-
garded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its
function in laying down policies and establishing standards,
while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the determina-
tion of facts to which the policy as declared by the legislature is
to apply. Without capacity to give authorizations of that sort we
should have the anomaly of a legislative power which in many
circumstances calling for its exertion would be but a futility.39
Such delegations, however, were intended to be limited. Profes-
sor Kenneth Culp Davis wrote that "[w]hen the federal courts re-
treated from their former asserted position that Congress could not
delegate legislative power, they transformed the nondelegation
doctrine into the proposition that Congress could not delegate
without meaningful standards."'40 The Court spelled out the guide-
lines intended to limit such delegations in J.W. Hampton, Jr. &
Co. v. United States.41 The Court stated first the practical rule
that "[i]n determining what it [Congress] may do in seeking assis-
tance from another branch, the extent and character of that assis-
tance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent
necessities of the governmental co-ordination. ' 42 Delegation of leg-
islative power is permissible, the Court concluded, "[i]f Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform. '43
38. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
39. Id. at 421.
40. K. DAvis, supra note 11, at 151.
41. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
42. Id. at 406.
43. Id. at 409 (emphasis added).
10551990]
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The "intelligible principle" standard resulted in a new, more
pragmatic interpretation of nondelegation. The Court designed the
standard to ensure that Congress would provide the delegate ade-
quate instructions to guide its behavior. Under such a standard,
the legislature would retain the power of "making the law." The
Court feared that absent such legislative guidance, the delegate
would be forced to employ its own discretion and to formulate its
own policies as a means of compensating for the legislature's dere-
liction.44 Such discretion would be an unconstitutional exercise of
the legislative power by a body otherwise restricted to either en-
forcing or interpreting the law.
In its earlier Clark decision, the Court had taken pains to under-
score this critical distinction between making and executing the
law:
"The true distinction ... is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what
it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execu-
tion, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made."45
The Court adopted the same analysis in Hampton, concluding that
the delegation before it was permissible because "[w]hat the Presi-
dent was required to do [in that instance] was merely in execution
of the act of Congress."'46
Soon after articulating in the intelligible principle standard
Hampton, the Court employed it in Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States47 and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.48 In both cases,
44. In United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), the Court noted that "[flormulation of
policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it by the electorate, and to the
extent Congress delegates authority under indefinite standards, this policy-making function
is passed on to other agencies, often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the
people." Id. at 276.
45. Clark, 143 U.S. at 693-94 (quoting Cincinnati, Wilmington R.R. v. Commissioners, 1
Ohio St. 77, 88-89 (1852)).
46. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 410-11; see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (" 'In
the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully
executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker.'" (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952))).
47. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
48. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
1056 [Vol. 31:1047
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the Court declared provisions of the National Industrial Recovery
Act unconstitutional for violating the nondelegation doctrine.49
Suspicions of political motivations,5" however, have marred the leg-
acy of the two decisions. Today, they have the dubious distinction
of being the last successful applications of the nondelegation
doctrine.5 1
In the wake of Schechter and Panama Refining, the intelligible
principle standard became a virtual non-entity.52 The late 1930s
49. In Schechter, Chief Justice Hughes maintained that "Congress is not permitted to
abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is thus
vested." 295 U.S. at 529. The Court found that in promulgating the Live Poultry Code, § 3
of the NIRA, and in leaving the definition of "fair competition" to be addressed by the
industry in question, Congress had done just that. The Court concluded that "[s]uch a dele-
gation of legislative power is unknown to our law and is utterly inconsistent with the consti-
tutional prerogatives and duties of Congress." Id. at 537.
Similarly, in Panama Refining, the Court struck down § 9(c) of the NIRA for "estab-
lish[ing] no criterion to govern the President's course . . ." 293 U.S. at 415. The Court
wrote that "in every case in which the question has been raised, the Court has recognized
that there are limits of delegation which there is no constitutional authority to transcend.
We think that § 9(c) goes beyond those limits." Id. at 430.
50. Commentators have suggested that the cases were intended more as means of frus-
trating the aims of President Roosevelt's New Deal than as sincere efforts to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine and the Hampton standard. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson,
supra note 9, at 10; Gellhorn, supra note 33, at 353; Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers,
supra note 15, at 357 n.14.
51. Some question exists whether Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), is a
nondelegation case; if it is, that decision would usurp the dubious distinction currently re-
tained by Schechter and Panama Refining. At least one Justice and one commentator have
suggested that Carter is a nondelegation case. See Federal Power Comm'n v. New England
Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 354 n.2 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); Note, The Independent
Agency After Bowsher v. Synar-Alive and Kicking, 40 VAND. L. REv. 903, 908 n.22 (1987).
Judge Scalia maintained in Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub
nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), however, that although the statutory provision
at issue in Carter was a "'legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form,'" the Court's
holding "appear[ed] to rest primarily upon denial of substantive due process rights." Id. at
1383 n.8 (quoting Carter, 298 U.S. at 311).
52. Professor Lowi explained that "the factor most immediately and obviously involved in
the transformation from congressional to presidential government was the voluntary, self-
conscious rendering of legislative power to the President, thence to the agencies in the exec-
utive branch. I call the process 'legiscide.'" Lowi, supra note 15, at 299. The rendering of
legislative power to the agencies in the post-Schechter period was due in large part to
[the] major shift to functionalism after 1935. The Supreme Court relaxed the
Myers rule that all governmental actions had to fit into one of the three formal
boxes of legislative, executive, or judicial action. Academic commentators and
the courts supported the New Deal's institutional innovations-hybrid organs
of government with blended powers. By 1952, Justice Jackson's influential con-
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through the early 1970s saw the standard eviscerated 53 to the point
at which no provision Congress could write would trigger any more
than circumspect judicial scrutiny. One commentator even advised
that "[l]awyers who try to win cases by arguing that congressional
delegations are unconstitutional almost invariably do more harm
than good to their clients' interests" and that "[m]uch of the judi-
cial talk about requirement of standards is contrary to the action
the Supreme Court takes when delegations are made without stan-
dards. The vaguest of standards are held adequate, and various
delegations without standards have been upheld. ' 54 Indeed, courts
routinely upheld vague delegations.55
As the nondelegation doctrine fell into obscurity, it lived, as
some commentators explained, "a fugitive existence at the edge of
constitutional jurisprudence."56 Although fleeting references in an
occasional dissent or concurrence saved the doctrine from extinc-
currence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer proposed a separation of
powers doctrine premised on flexibility, practicality, and judicial reluctance to
enforce the doctrine based on isolated parts of the Constitution.
Note, supra note 23, at 1767-68. For further discussion of the New Deal's revision of the
original separation of powers arrangement, see Sunstein, supra note 21; Note, A Two-Tiered
Theory of Consolidation and Separation of Powers, 99 YALE L.J. 431, 438 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Note, A Two-Tiered Theory].
53. See Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1227 (The approach dur-
ing this period "robbed the delegation doctrine of content and intellectual respectability
and blunted its ability to curb flagrant delegations of legislative power.").
54. K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.01 (1958).
55. Professor Scalia noted, "Several agencies have been operating. . . under a legislative
mandate no more specific than to pursue the 'public interest, convenience and necessity.'"
Scalia, supra note 9, at 27. Examples of broad delegations that the Court upheld include:
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948) (providing for recovery of "excessive
profits" earned on war contracts); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420 (1944) (author-
izing the President to appoint a price administrator to set maximum wartime prices "in the
interest of the national defense and security"); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas
Co., 320 U.S. 591, 600 (1944) (setting "just and reasonable" rates for natural gas); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-27 (1943) (licensing of radio communi-
cations "as public convenience, interest or necessity requires"); United States v. Rock Royal
Co-op, 307 U.S. 533, 545 n.4 (1939) (authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to fix minimum
prices for farm commodities at levels deemed to be "reasonable" and in "the public inter-
est"); New York Cent. Secs. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24 (1932) (permitting con-
solidation of carriers when "in the public interest"). For an extensive supplementary listing
of judicial ratifications of broad delegations, see Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374,
1383 n.9 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
56. Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 17.
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tion,57 by the early 1970s nondelegation was, in Justice Marshall's
words, "moribund" and "virtually abandoned by the Court for all
practical purposes. '58 Attempting to account for the doctrine's ero-
sion, then Judge Scalia wrote in Synar v. United States59 that the
Supreme Court's decisions "display[ed] a much greater deference
to Congress' power to delegate, motivated in part by concerns that
'[fln an increasingly complex society Congress obviously could not
perform its functions if it were obliged to find all the facts subsidi-
ary to the basic conclusions which support the defined legislative
policy.' "60
57. See K. DAVIS, supra note 11, at 199. Davis grudgingly conceded that "remarks of Su-
preme Court Justices during the 1960s and 1970s show that the nondelegation retains at
least some slight vitality, even though the vitality has more to do with verbiage than with
holdings." Id.; see Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 754-55. The most notable of such references
to nondelegation were Justice Brennan's concurrence in United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967), and the second Justice Harlan's partial concurrence and dissent in Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). In Arizona, Justice Harlan complained that "[this] delega-
tion of such unrestrained authority to an executive official raises . . . the gravest constitu-
tional doubts." Id. at 625-26 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
In Robel, Justice Brennan complained that "the standard under which Congress delegated
the designating power is so indefinite as to be meaningless." Robel, 389 U.S. at 272-73
(Brennan, J., dissenting). But cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. New England Power Co., 415
U.S. 345 (1974). In Federal Power Commission, Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Mar-
shall's disparaging depiction of an obsolete nondelegation doctrine. The contradiction may
stem in part from the fact that the vague delegation in the Robel decision affected criminal
sanctions, thus implicating liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights. Robel, 389 U.S. at
275 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see infra notes 202-07 and accompanying text.
58. Federal Power Commission, 415 U.S. at 353 (Marshall, J., concurring). Admittedly,
the Court was continuing to use the doctrine in an "interpretive mode, finding that statu-
tory texts conferring powers on the Executive should be construed narrowly where broader
construction might represent an unconstitutional delegation. Such cases indicate that while
the delegation doctrine may be moribund, it has not yet been officially interred by the
Court." Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1384 (citations omitted). This depiction of the Court's han-
dling of the doctrine was confirmed in Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), as
the Court acknowledged that "[fln recent years, our application of the nondelegation doc-
trine principally has been limited to the interpretation of statutory texts, and, more particu-
larly, to giving narrow constructions to statutory delegations that might otherwise be
thought to be unconstitutional." Id. at 655 n.7; see Scalia, supra note 9, at 27; G. STONE, L.
SEIDMAN, C. SUNSTEIN & M. TUSHNET, CONsTrruTiONAL LAW 369 (1986) [hereinafter G.
STONE].
59. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), afl'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
60. Id. at 1384 (quoting Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941)); see
supra note 37.
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Phase 2-The Gradual Comeback
As problems accrue, the expected backlash
The accretion of dangerous power does not come in a day. It
does come, however slowly, from the generative force of un-
checked disregard of the restrictions that fence in even the most
disinterested assertion of authority.61
To the extent that its proponents envisioned the nondelegation
doctrine as an integral bulwark of the separation of powers, the
doctrine's erosion through an "unchecked disregard" for its import
in the constitutional scheme worked a fundamental disruption in
the balance of powers among the branches. As Justice Frankfurter
predicted in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,6 2 both in-
dependent and executive agencies were slowly accruing power at
the expense of the legislative branch."' The quality rather than
quantity of the increasingly expansive delegations was disturbing.
As the doctrine's influence waned, delegations became virtually
standardless and Congress left to the agencies the exercise of dis-
cretion-or lawmaking-concerning many critical policy matters.64
The conclusion that independent agencies and the executive
branch were not only executing the law but making it as well ulti-
mately worked to revive the nondelegation doctrine's original con-
61. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 594 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
62. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
63. See id. Congress did not attempt to halt the ebb of power from its reaches, however.
See McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1119,
1128-29 (1977) (suggesting that Congress often embraces broad delegations for "reasons of
internal political maneuver or as an escape from having to stand up and be counted");
Scalia, Legislative Veto, supra note 14, at 24 (suggesting Congress delegates issues because
they are "too hot to handle"); Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 370
(observing that "delegation allows politicians to enact laws that promise all things to all
people"); see also G. STONE, supra note 58, at 366 ("A broad delegation of authority thus
allows Congress to claim the credit for identification of a problem while insulating it from
attack if particular solutions exacerbate that problem."); Dripps, Delegation and Due Pro-
cess, 1988 DuKE L.J. 657, 668 (explaining that "[m]odern public choice theory suggests that
delegation enables individual legislators to reduce the political costs of policies that injure
relatively uninterested voters, without losing credit for benefits bestowed on those interest
groups intensely enough motivated to trace the chain of power").
64. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
1060 [Vol. 31:1047
1990] NONDELEGATION AFTER Mistretta 1061
cerns, prompting a period of "renewed respectability"6 5 for the
doctrine in the late 1970s through the 1980s. Many commentators
believed the threat that delegations posed to the constitutional
framework could not be underestimated. 6 As Professor Lowi
stated: "[T]he delegation of broad and undefined discretionary
power from the legislature to the executive branch deranges virtu-
ally all constitutional relationships and prevents attainment of the
constitutional goals of limitation on power, substantive calculabil-
ity, and procedural calculability. 61 7 The objection was not "that
such 'faceless bureaucrats' necessarily do a bad job as our effective
legislators. It [was] rather that they are neither elected nor re-
elected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who
are.
''169
65. Scalia, supra note 9, at 27.
66. See supra note 15.
67. Lowi, supra note 15, at 296.
68. Besides the constitutional objection central to this Note's focus-namely, that by vir-
tue of broad delegations, the executive and independent agencies are unconstitutionally ex-
ercising legislative powers-there are other substantial arguments regarding the unconstitu-
tionality of independent agencies in particular. Critics of these agencies, including former
Attorney General Edwin Meese, argue that, based on formalist separation of powers analy-
sis, the President should be free to remove all federal officials exercising law enforcement
powers, a power in the critics' eyes unconstitutionally denied the President by the make-up
of the independent agencies. See Taylor, Jr., A Question of Power, A Powerful Questioner,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3.
69. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRusT 131 (1980). In Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doc-
trine, supra note 15, Professor Schoenbrod states:
Citizens interested in how their representative has acted on hard issues cannot
necessarily get the answer from voting records, but instead must search out
what happened administratively under delegations that the legislature author-
ized. Even if members of the public could and would penetrate the complexity
and stultifying aridity of the Federal Register and other agency publications,
the member can deny responsibility by claiming personal disagreement with
what was done.
Id. at 1244-45. And in Stewart, Beyond Delegation, supra note 15, Professor Stewart states:
The fundamental principle is that government may not coerce citizens except
in accordance with legal authority granted through politically responsible
processes of representative government. . . .We no longer accept James Lan-
dis' New Deal view that broad delegations to administrative specialists could
tap expertise in order to reduce decisionmaking costs and errors without loss of
democratic responsiveness and accountability.
Id. at 331.
Any argument grounded on notions of accountability stands on admittedly weaker ground
today; the exceedingly high winning percentage for congressional incumbents, cited as 99%
in a recent Wall Street Journal editorial, substantially dims the prospects of ousting even
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Besides the efficacy of constitutional arguments, the "pendulum
may [already] have begun to swing against broad delegation""0 in
the 1970s and 1980s as a result of public dissatisfaction with both
independent and executive agencies. As Professor Stewart has
observed:
It is no accident that the revival of interest in the delegation
doctrine in recent years has coincided with a sweeping expan-
sion of centralized federal command and control regulation. We
have become addicted to Federal rules and orders that attempt
to minutely prescribe conduct throughout our complexly differ-
entiated society. This addiction has created severe decisionmak-
ing and political overload at the center. In turn, overload has
resulted in a massive transfer of decisional power to federal ad-
ministrative bureaucracies, provoking calls for vigorous enforce-
ment by the courts of the delegation doctrine in order to restore
"juridical democracy. ''17
Administrative agencies had lost their "reputation of being pan-
aceas, '72 and "[p]ublic antipathy to overregulation by Washington
bureaucracies could provide popular support for judicial require-
ments that Congress legislate more specifically in order to limit
agency discretion. '7 3
the most offensive representative. Addicted to Government, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1990, at A14,
col. 1. In addition, perhaps "[a]ll agencies of government, except the federal courts, are
either directly or indirectly responsible to the people" and indirect responsibility may not
result in "weaker control over the agencies." M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207-08 (1988).
Nevertheless, the incumbents' electoral advantage should not render the accountability
argument negligible. The fact that a congressman is harder to remove today than twenty
years ago does not void the elementary constitutional principle that the congressman be
forced to answer to constituents every two years and that he or she be subject to removal at
his or her constituents' choosing. Tushnet's position institutionalizes unresponsiveness and
essentially denies constituents the right to hold legislators responsible for the policy deci-
sions they are constitutionally charged with making.
70. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1226.
71. Stewart, Beyond Delegation, supra note 15, at 329 (footnote omitted).
72. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1226. In addition to Profes-
sor Schoenbrod's critique of agency performance, see Goldsmith, supra note 16, at 757;
Lowi, supra note 15, at 304-05; Scalia, Legislative Veto, supra note 14, at 24; Stewart, Be-
yond Delegation, supra note 15, at 324.
73. Stewart, Beyond Delegation, supra note 15, at 324 (footnote omitted).
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The justices go to war
Perhaps the most important factor behind the nondelegation
doctrine's revival was the influence and forceful advocacy of its
well-placed proponents, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia. If the Supreme Court invokes the nondelegation doctrine in
the near future, it will do so on the terms and in the contexts
stated by these two justices.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist did not speak for the doctrine
until the 1980s, Justice Scalia advocated its revival in the late
1970s while a professor at the University of Chicago Law School.
Writing in 1979, Professor Scalia candidly discussed the c.onse-
quences of the doctrine's erosion and the legislature's propensity
for increasingly broad delegations:
Well, who can oppose the prevention of "unreasonable risks of
injury," or the provision of "safe and healthful places of employ-
ment," or the elimination of "sex discrimination"? We can all
embrace these platitudes. But what do they mean? . . . Does
the provision of a "safe place of employment" require split toilet
seats, or the relocation of all fire extinguishers so that they are
precisely X inches from the floor? . . . These are the sorts of
issues that lay beneath the platitudes when these pieces of legis-
lation were passed, and Congress chose to leave them to the
agencies ... to resolve.
Congress has been behaving in this fashion for much of the
past fifty years .... "'
Professor Scalia argued that the "bureaucracy is not unresponsive,
only unelected; that procedures are no substitute for the ballot
box; and that congressional control is no longer possible. '75 A year
later, he was prepared to stake out what at the time was still the
relatively controversial position that "even with all its Franken-
stein-like warts, knobs, and (concededly) dangers, the unconstitu-
tional delegation doctrine is worth hewing from the ice. The alter-
native appears to be continuation of the widely felt trend toward
government by bureaucracy or (what is no better) government by
courts. 7 8
74. Scalia, Legislative Veto, supra note 14, at 23-24.
75. Id. at 26.
76. Scalia, supra note 9, at 28.
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As a professor, Scalia was swayed by the intellectual appeal of
nondelegation. As a district court judge, however, he was hand-
cuffed by precedent. In Synar v. United States, Judge Scalia
wrote, "Our analysis of the delegation challenged in the instant
cases. . . proceeds on the assumption that the delegation doctrine
remains valid law, but that its scope must be determined on the
basis of the deferential post-Schechter cases decided by the Su-
preme Court. 78
In Synar, the plaintiffs argued that the Gramm-Rudman-Hol-
lings Balanced Budget Act's79 delegation to administration officials
of the power to make the economic calculations that determine the
estimated federal deficit, and hence the required budget cuts, vio-
lated the constitutional provision vesting "all legislative power" in
Congress. 80 A novel aspect of the claim in Synar, however, was the
argument that the appropriations power delegated under the Act
was per se nondelegable.8s Hence, even the most detailed instruc-
tions guiding administration officials could not save such a
delegation.
Judge Scalia summarily rejected the per se nondelegable tack.8 2
The Supreme Court had never held any legislative power nondele-
77. During his tenure on the district court, however, Judge Scalia took pains to convey
that he considered the nondelegation argument valid. Noting in Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), that "[ilt is
strictly unnecessary for us to reach this point" because the Act in question was found un-
constitutional on the ground that it vested executive power in the Comptroller-General, an
officer removable by Congress, Scalia embarked nonetheless on a lengthy discussion of the
nondelegation argument put forth before the court. Id. at 1382.
78. Id. at 1384.
79. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99
Stat. 1038 (1985).
80. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1382.
81. Id. at 1385. The plaintiff's approach uniquely conceived of the nondelegation doctrine
as offering two prongs of attack:
1) the vagueness tack-that while delegating permissibly delegable powers,
Congress has erred in leaving its instructions to the delegate so vague that the
delegate must employ his own discretion and act as a lawmaker himself. This
would amount to the unconstitutional delegation of Congress's express power
to make the law.
2) the nondelegable tack-that certain powers are so inherently a part of the
legislative system as to be "core" legislative functions and per se nondelegable.
Any delegations of such powers are, as such, per se unconstitutional,
82. Id. at 1385-86. A unanimous Supreme Court recently followed Scalia in rejecting the
per se nondelegable tack. In Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 109 S. Ct. 1726 (1989),
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gable because it was among Congress' "core functions." Judge
Scalia opined that such a core functions analysis would be effec-
tively standardless and that even if core functions were defined,
"there is no reason to believe that appropriations functions would
be among them."''
Although he dismissed the plaintiffs' per se nondelegable theory,
Judge Scalia openly supported the nondelegation doctrine gener-
ally and articulated his own interpretation of the doctrine:
[T]he ultimate judgment regarding the constitutionality of a
delegation must be made not on the basis of the scope of the
power alone, but on the basis of its scope plus the specificity of
the standards governing its exercise. When the scope increases
to immense proportions (as in Schechter), the standards must
be correspondingly more precise.8 4
Although the particular scope of the appropriations power and the
specificity of the delegation at issue in Synar allowed the Act to
withstand a nondelegation doctrine challenge, Scalia's receptive-
ness to such challenges left Synar noteworthy in the chronicle of
the doctrine's revival.
Justice Scalia set prudent restraints on his understanding of the
doctrine's application in Mistretta v. United States85 and joined
the Court in rejecting the doctrine's application to that case, but
his dissenting opinion confirmed his faith in the doctrine's intellec-
tual viability. Justice Scalia wrote, "It is difficult to imagine a prin-
ciple more essential to democratic government than that upon
which the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is founded: Ex-
cept in a few areas constitutionally committed to the Executive
plaintiff Mid-America argued that Congress' taxing power was at most per se nondelegable
and at least a delegation governed by much stricter guidelines than required for other con-
gressional delegations. In rejecting this contention, Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court:
"We find no support, then, for Mid-America's contention that the text of the Constitution
or the practices of Congress require the application of a different and stricter nondelegation
doctrine in cases where Congress delegates discretionary authority to the Executive under
its taxing power." Id. at 1733.
83. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1385.
84. Id. at 1386.
85. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). For a further description of Scalia's analysis, see infra notes
134-44 and accompanying text.
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Branch, the basic policy decisions governing society are to be made
by the Legislature.""8
Some of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions similarly opened the
door for plaintiffs like those in Synar to include nondelegation ar-
guments in their claims. Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Indus-
trial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute17 and
his dissent in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Dono-
van8 8 illustrated his belief that the nondelegation doctrine ap-
proach remained viable. In Industrial Union, Justice Rehnquist
complained that the "governmental body best suited and most ob-
ligated to make the choice confronting us in this litiga-
tion"-whether the statistical possibility of future deaths should
ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing
those deaths-"has improperly delegated that choice to the Secre-
tary of Labor and, derivatively, to this Court."'89
Although acknowledging that the nondelegation doctrine had
eroded to the point at which "the most that may be asked under
the separation-of-powers doctrine is that Congress lay down the
general policy and standards that animate the law, leaving the
agency to refine those standards, 'fill in the blanks,' or apply the
standards to particular cases," 90 Justice Rehnquist concluded that
the statutory provision in question failed to pass muster.91 Justice
Rehnquist admonished that "[the Court] ought not to shy away
from our judicial duty to invalidate unconstitutional delegations of
legislative authority solely out of concern that we should thereby
reinvigorate discredited constitutional doctrines of the pre-New
Deal era." 92
86. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. 448 U.S. 607, 686-87 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The delegation controversy
here and in American Textile centered on the phrase "to the extent feasible" in § 6(b)(5) of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1982). The section directed
the Secretary of Labor to "set the standard which most adequately assures, to the extent
feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity. .. ." Id.
88. 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Rehnquist, J. and Burger, C.J., dissenting).
89. Industrial Union, 448 U.S. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 675 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 686 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]he standard of 'feasibility' renders mean-
ingful judicial review impossible.").
92. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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In American Textile, Justice Rehnquist reiterated his conviction
that the nondelegation doctrine mandated that the Court find the
statutory provision at issue in Industrial Union unconstitutional:
[I]n failing to agree on whether the Secretary should be either
mandated, permitted, or prohibited from undertaking a cost-
benefit analysis, Congress simply left the crucial policy choices
in the hands of the Secretary of Labor. . . .I believe that in so
doing Congress unconstitutionally delegated its legislative re-
sponsibility to the Executive Branch. 3
The ascent of the formalist school
The final factor in the nondelegation doctrine's return to re-
spectability was the ascendancy of the formalist approach to sepa-
ration of powers issues. This view dominated the Court from 1976
to 1988.94 As formalism went, so too went the nondelegation doc-
trine. Both theories enjoyed simultaneous returns to respectability
in the mid-1980s9 5 This result is not surprising, for "[t]he nondele-
gation doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers
that underlies our tripartite system of government."96 Indeed, the
nondelegation doctrine is a corollary of formalism, 7 as both have
at their core the notion that each branch alone should exercise its
own powers.
Phase 3-The Setbacks
If the nondelegation doctrine's return to respectability was due
in small part to the parallel ascendancy of the formalist separation
of powers philosophy, logic suggests that the latter's fall would
have a corresponding impact on the doctrine. In fact, the formalist
93. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 548 (1981).
94. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
95. The nondelegation doctrine had just received prominent mention in the Rehnquist
concurrence and dissent, see supra text accompanying notes 87-93, and was about to receive
substantial attention in Judge Scalia's Synar opinion, see supra text accompanying notes
78-84. At the same time, the formalist philosophy had manifested its predominance in two
of the Court's landmark decisions. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
96. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654 (1989); see Synar v. United States, 626
F. Supp. 1374, 1383 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
97. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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school has realized two severe setbacks in the past two years,98
both of which may prevent the nondelegation doctrine's comeback.
In Morrison v. Olson, the Court vehemently rejected a formalis-
tic separation of powers analysis.99 Advocating a more flexible ap-
proach,100 the Court noted that "we have never held that the Con-
stitution requires that the three Branches of Government 'operate
with absolute independence.' "101 Although neither the majority
opinion nor Justice Scalia's dissent discussed the nondelegation
doctrine in particular, such sentiments signal a more liberal, even
acquiescent approach toward delegations. Delegations are, after all,
the means by which interdependency among the branches is
forged.
Although it did not explicitly employ classic functionalist lan-
guage, the Court demonstrated a concern for the guiding principles
behind functionalism: encroachment of one branch's power and ag-
grandizement of that power to another branch. As to the former
concern, the Court said that a separation of powers violation would
occur when the encroached power was "of such a nature that [it]
impede[d] the [branch's] ability to perform [its] constitutional
duty . . *..,,0 As to the latter concern, the Court stressed that
Morrison did not involve a congressional attempt to gain control
over an executive officer, 0 3 a fact that Justice Scalia vigorously
contested in his dissent.10 4
98. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 647; Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
99. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988); see Note, Chipping Away at the President's Control over his
Administration: An Analysis of Morrison v. Olson and Beyond, VI J. LAW & POL. 205, 226
(1989) ("If Justice Scalia is correct and the majority has simply thrown up its hands in
frustration and resorted to an ad hoc balancing test, Morrison is an ominous signal for sepa-
ration of powers formalism.").
100. Dean George Alexander described the Court's balancing approach in Morrison as a
"shift of power test" that focuses on "the extent to which power is actually shifted from one
branch of government to another." Alexander, Separation of Powers After the Independent
Counsel Decision, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1989) (ultimately concluding that the
Court should not involve itself in disputes between the legislative and executive branches).
101. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2620 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707
(1974)).
102. Id. at 2619.
103. Id. at 2616, 2620.
104. Describing the special prosecutor law as arising out of a dispute between Congress
and the President, Justice Scalia stated:
That is what this suit is about. Power. The allocation of power among Con-
gress, the President and the courts in such fashion as to preserve the equil-
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Professor Keith Werhan has asserted that in Morrison the Court
did not merely muddle through the functionalist approach, but
rather enunciated a new "eclectic" test that somehow merged the
formal and functional inquiries.10 5 According to Werhan, Justice
Rehnquist's focus on the text and history of the appointments
clause at the beginning of the Morrison opinion demonstrates that
the Court now employs an eclectic two-pronged approach: First, it
makes a formalist inquiry into the text and history of the Constitu-
tion; second, if formalism does not answer the question, the Court
inquires into encroachment and aggrandizement. 10 6
Werhan's proposition is ill-founded. Even by his own admission,
the Constitution and its separation of powers history speak only to
the "easy" cases. 10 7 Under Werhan's model, formalism can seldom
adequately address cases before the Court, which consequently al-
most always will apply a functionalist analysis. In the end, this
amounts to a shift to functionalism.
Further, Werhan misplaced his reliance on Chief Justice Rehn-
quist's use of text and history, which could be merely a rhetorical
tool to justify his use of functionalism. Indeed, one commentator
has speculated that the reason the Chief Justice, formerly a strong
formalist, authored the Morrison opinion was to ensure that he
could later limit the case to its facts. 08 This might explain the
opinion's muddled application of the functionalist approach.10 9 Fi-
nally, the Mistretta opinion defies the proposition that a novel
"eclectic" approach now orchestrates the Court's separation of
powers jurisprudence. Mistretta began not with Werhan's expected
librium the Constitution sought to establish-so that "a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department," can effectively be resisted. Fre-
quently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in
sheep's clothing... [b]ut this wolf comes as a wolf.
Id. at 2623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). For a succinct analysis of Scalia's dis-
sent, see Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Govern-
ment, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2-4, 23.
105. Werhan, supra note 7, at 432-33, 445.
106. Id. at 445.
107. Id. at 446.
108. Note, supra note 99, at 237 n.163.
109. See id. at 225 ("[T]he majority opinion was ambiguous about the precise basis for its
decision. In fact, it provided at least three different rationales for upholding the indepen-
dent counsel scheme. . . . Thus the precise constitutional basis for this decision is painfully
unclear.").
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textual analysis, but rather with a general discussion of separation
of powers theory.11 °
Justice Scalia's dissent in Morrison demonstrated the traditional
formalist approach to separation of powers analysis. Under Scalia's
approach, one must first classify the power exercised.' In Morri-
son, even the majority opinion conceded that the powers at issue,
investigation and prosecution, were executive powers." 2
The second step under formalist analysis is to determine who
exercises the power. 113 The Constitution requires that the ex-
ercisor's classification mirror the classification of the power exer-
cised. Thus, only the executive branch may exercise executive pow-
ers, such as prosecution. Employing his formalist standard, Justice
Scalia concluded that the independent counsel provision of the Act
deprived the President of control over executive power and thus
violated the separation of powers doctrine.114 For Scalia, who
gained control of the executive functions at issue was irrelevant;
that the President no longer controlled them was enough."'
Prior to the Morrison decision, the formalist approach had dom-
inated the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence. 116 Yet in
Morrison, Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter from an un-
characteristically functionalist opinion. Morrison marked a signifi-
cant break from the recent line of separation of powers opinions."'
That Morrison was just that-a break and not a mere aberra-
110. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 658-59 (1989).
111. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2619 ("There is no real dispute that the functions performed by the indepen-
dent counsel are 'executive' in the sense that they are law enforcement functions that typi-
cally have been undertaken by officials within the Executive Branch.").
113. Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2631 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115. Scalia continued: "It is not for us to determine, and we have never presumed to
determine, how much of the purely executive powers of government must be within the full
control of the President. The Constitution prescribes that they all are." Id. at 2628 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
116. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
117. Professor Richard Pierce, Jr., has described the state of separation of powers juris-
prudence after Morrison with three observations. First, the Court has chosen not to create a
"free-standing doctrine of separation of powers." Pierce, Jr., supra note 104, at 21. Second,
it is granting "politically accountable branches" much deference when they agree to change
institutional structures. Id. at 21-22. Third, "the Court has defined the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers ... only by enforcing other principles that are firmly rooted in the text and
history of the Constitution." Id. at 22.
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tion-became apparent when the Court followed it with another
functionalist decision in Mistretta v. United States."8 Viewed to-
gether, the decisions may be the harbinger of what will become of
the nondelegation doctrine.
In the subsequent Mistretta opinion, the Court expressly recog-
nized that the "nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of
separation of powers."""9 Justice Blackmun wrote the eight-mem-
ber majority opinion in functionalist language, however, that pre-
cluded the doctrine's assertion. Blackmun characterized the recent
line of separation of powers cases as demonstrating a "concern of
encroachment and aggrandizement,"' 120 the polestars of functional-
ism.121 Using these polestars, Blackmun fashioned criteria to ana-
lyze the constitutionality of binding rules issued by an indepen-
dent rulemaking body located, allegedly, in the judicial branch.
First, citing Morrison, Blackmun stated that the judicial branch
must not be assigned "'tasks that are more appropriately accom-
plished by [other] branches.' 122 Second, Blackmun stressed that
the "'institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch' ,,123 must not
be threatened.
Employing those criteria, the Court concluded that rules gov-
erning sentencing are an appropriate subject for a judicial branch
agency because the sentencing function is an integral part of the
judicial process.2 4 The Court also held that the Sentencing Com-
mission did not threaten the institutional integrity of the judicial
branch because the Commission "is not a court, does not exercise
judicial power, and is not controlled by or accountable to members
118. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
119. Id. at 654 (citing Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
120. Id. at 659.
121. See Comment, supra note 7, at 123 ("A functional interpretation looks at the practi-
cal effect of the overall structural relationship created by the entity to see whether the con-
trol mechanism actually creates an imbalance of power among the branches."); Note, supra
note 99, at 215 ("[F]unctionalism stresses a less literal approach to separation of powers
issues by providing for judicial assessment of whether the law in question invades a core
function of a branch of government or is merely an insignificant encroachment.").
122. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 660 (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597, 2601
(1988)).
123. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851
(1986)).
124. Id. at 664.
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of the Judicial Branch.' 1 25 Again, the Court employed a pragmatic,
functional analysis to validate a "commingl[ing of] the functions of
the Branches. . .that pose no danger of either aggrandizement or
encroachment.' 126
If Morrison represents the Court's new, more permissive stance
on the commingling of government functions, that the Court found
the appellants' nondelegation arguments in Mistretta unpersuasive
is no surprise. As is typical of modern nondelegation decisions, 27
the Court retreated to an explanation of the necessities of congres-
sional delegation, stating that "our jurisprudence has been driven
by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex soci-
ety, replete with ever changing and more technical problems, Con-
gress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power
under broad general directives." 28 This explanation does little to
explain why Congress necessarily had to place the Sentencing
Commission in the judicial branch and require the appointment of
federal judges to the Commission, 29 none of whom had much sen-
tencing expertise.130 The explanation does reveal, however, that the
Court has no intention of requiring narrow delegations of power
from Congress.
The majority gave mere lip service to the intelligible principle
standard set forth in J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,'3'
and reiterated its approval of broad delegations, stating that "this
Court has deemed it 'constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly
delineates the general policy, the public agency which is to apply
it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.' "132 The Court
completed its analysis by listing the various directions Congress
gave the Commission in the enabling legislation.133
125. Id. at 665.
126. Id. at 660.
127. See supra note 37.
128. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 654.
129. See infra notes 152-64 and accompanying text.
130. Reply Brief for Respondent, United States v. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989) (Nos.
87-1904, 87-7028).
131. 276 U.S. 394 (1928); see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
132. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 655 (quoting American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S.
90 (1946)).
133. Id. at 656.
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Even Justice Scalia, again the lone dissenter, agreed with the
Court's rejection of the nondelegation argument, though for differ-
ent reasons. He stressed first the importance of the nondelegation
principle in a tripartite form of government.13 4 Justice Scalia then
postulated that "[e]xcept in a few areas constitutionally committed
to the Executive Branch, the basic policy decisions governing soci-
ety are to be made by the Legislature."' 35 In Justice Scalia's analy-
sis, "[i]t should be apparent. . . that the decisions made by the
Commission are far from technical, but are heavily laden (or ought
to be) with value judgments and policy assessments."'3 6 Thus, Jus-
tice Scalia all but concluded that the Commission exercised legisla-
tive power in violation of the nondelegation doctrine.
Justice Scalia posited, however, that a court must recognize pru-
dent limitations on its application of the nondelegation doctrine.
Under his theory, no statute is completely precise and those exe-
cuting and applying the law thus need to make judgments, some of
which involve policy considerations.137 Accordingly, the question is
not "Is there a delegation of legislative (policymaking) authority?"
but rather "How much delegation of legislative (policymaking) au-
thority is too much?"' 38 Justice Scalia quoted the concern set forth
in Hampton: "[T]he limits of delegation 'must be fixed according
to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental
co-ordination.' ",139 Scalia consequently argued that the Court
should not be too willing to second guess Congress on how much
delegation is necessary because Congress is equally endowed with
common sense and better able to inform itself of the necessities of
government.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's prudential limitations on the
doctrine, he clearly believed that the Court decided Mistretta
wrongly. 40 Delegations, in his view, are necessary incidents to the
134. Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
140. Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a critique of the majority opinion in Mistretta,
see generally Note, "The Judge Would Then Be The Legislator". Dismantling Separation
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execution and adjudication of statutes. The express delegation of
lawmaking authority to the Sentencing Commission, however, was
not incidental to any executive or judicial function and was there-
fore unconstitutional. As Justice Scalia explained:
The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not
that Congress is sometimes too busy or too divided and can
therefore assign its responsibility of making law to someone else;
but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and thus of law-
making, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up
to Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its
statutory commands, to determine-up to a point-how small or
how large that degree shall be. 4
Congress gave the Commission the responsibility of creating law
and informing Congress as to its progress; in Justice Scalia's mind,
this constituted a pure delegation of legislative power in violation
of the separation of powers doctrine. 42 The result of the Court's
allowance of such a pure delegation may be that "Congress will
find delegation of its lawmaking powers much more attractive in
the future' ' 43 and will create "all manner of 'expert' bodies, insu-
lated from the political process, to which Congress will delegate
various portions of its lawmaking responsibility.' 44
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE COURT'S SHIFT
On the verge of regaining currency only two years ago, the
nondelegation doctrine today seems as "moribund" as when Jus-
tice Marshall first invoked that characterization sixteen years
ago. 45 With the Court's abandonment of its earlier formalism for a
more functionalist approach in both Mistretta14' and Morrison,141
of Powers In The Name of Sentencing Reform-Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647
(1989), 65 WASH. L. REv. 249 (1990).
141. Id. at 678 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia concluded, "I think the Court errs, in other
words, not so much because it mistakes the degree of commingling, but because it fails to
recognize that this case is not about commingling, but about the creation of a new branch
altogether, a sort of junior-varsity Congress." Id. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
144. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. See supra note 11.
146. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989).
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the jurisprudential underpinnings of the doctrine appear to have
vanished. This development ironically occurred just as the con-
servative wing rose to majority status on the Court 4 and left sus-
pect the notion that formalism was an inviolable tenet of conserva-
tive jurisprudence. Indeed, "'a court that [was] more conservative
than at any time in the last 40 years' ",149 rendered two of the more
functionalist decisions in the Court's recent history. This peculiar
result may represent a profound intellectual shift in the Court's
separation of powers philosophy; or, the cases may illustrate mere
results-oriented decisionmaking. 15
0
147. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
148. See supra note 1.
149. Savage, Justice Consistently Conservative; Kennedy's Record Sours Liberals' Vic-
tory On Bork, L.A. Times, June 11, 1989, at 1, col. 5 (quoting Bruce Fein).
150. Professor William P. Murphy accused the Court of following a "results-oriented"
approach in its 1988-89 term:
The Court's decisions are discretionary within a wide range of available legal
guidelines which can-be selected or manipulated to rationalize any one of sev-
eral different results. It seems altogether clear that the Court is not bound, but
merely guided, by the text of whatever document it is construing, the intention
of the framers of the document, its own doctrines or its own case precedents.
W. Murphy, Supreme Court Review, Remarks Before the ABA Labor and Employment Law
Section (Aug. 7, 1989). Judge Laurence Silberman applied this thesis to separation of pow-
ers analysis. See L. Silberman, Remarks on Agency Autonomy and the Unitary Executive at
Conference on The Presidency and Congress: Constitutionally Separated and Shared Pow-
ers (January 19, 1990).
Judge Silberman explained that the Court's separation of powers jurisprudence hinged on
whether the power taken from one branch ends up in the judicial branch. He noted that in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) and Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), the Court upheld executive power, and that none of the statutes
at issue in these cases involved an accrual of power in the judicial branch. However,
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935), United States v. ICC, 337 U.S.
426 (1949), United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597
(1988) and Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989), all involved vesting some power
in the judicial branch. Judge Silberman stressed that this is not indicative of a conscious
effort by the justices to obtain power, but rather demonstrates an institution's faith in its
own fairness. Regardless of the Court's motivations, he said that one key to understanding
recent separation of powers cases is to look for the judiciary's real interest in the inter-
branch dispute. L. Silberman, supra. Certainly, other "results-oriented" explanations for
the Court's shift exist. For example, a plausible suggestion may be that the conservative
justices simply prefer a conservative White House regulating the agencies, not a liberal Con-
gress. In failing to enforce the nondelegation doctrine, they indirectly encourage such a re-
sult by allowing Congress to continue making broad delegations. This view is suspect, how-
ever, as it fails to explain the near unanimity of both Morrison and Misiretta, and relies on
unusually politically based motives of the justices.
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The Court's most recent separation of powers decision, Mis-
tretta, suggests that the results-oriented approach is a more accu-
rate characterization. Far from a cogent, well-reasoned discussion
of the Court's separation of powers philosophy, Mistretta stands
strangely deficient, perhaps an attempt to reach a particular result
absent traditional scholarly justification. 5' Specifically, the Court
failed to explain how it determined that the Sentencing Commis-
sion was located in the judicial branch for the purposes of separa-
tion of powers analysis. 152
Deciding which branch is exercising power is an a priori ques-
tion in both formalist and functionalist analysis. 53 Formalist anal-
ysis begins by asking which branch is exercising the power at issue.
Next, formalism inquires into the nature of the power being exer-
cised. Formalism dictates that if the answer to the two questions is
identical, the action is constitutional. 5 4 Thus, if one can manipu-
late the answer to the first question, one can manipulate the con-
stitutional outcome. Four possible ways exist to decide which
branch is exercising the power: (1) looking exqlusively at who con-
trols the agency or commission; (2) looking exclusively at what
powers the agency or commission exercises; (3) giving effect to con-
gressional language, when it exists, that says to which branch an
agency or commission belongs; or (4) employing some combination
of the above.
When Mistretta reached the Court, no one was sure in which
branch the Commission belonged for the purposes of separation of
151. Others have said the same about the Morrison decision. See supra note 170.
152. One author has concluded that the Court located the Commission in the judicial
branch out of deference to Congress' articulation of the Commission's placement in the stat-
ute. Comment, supra note 7, at 133 n.105. Although this may be accurate, the Court never
articulated such a reason in its decision and in fact later concluded that Congress exerted
the most control over the Commission. The Court also neglected to address Justice Scalia's
musings on the location issue.
153. For purposes of this section, we refer to this decision as the "location question."
154. The location question is at the foundation of functionalist analysis as well because
that approach focuses on encroachment of power from one branch and aggrandizement to
another branch. As Morrison demonstrates, the Court views separation of powers as being
more concerned with where the power ends up than from where it is taken. See Morrison,
108 S. Ct. at 2620-21. Indeed, this is evident from the fact that Congress can give significant
power to an independent agency, but it cannot give the same power to another branch. Cf.
Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 666 n.20.
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powers analysis. 15 The Senate explained the Commission's place-
ment in the judicial branch as merely the extension of a judicial
function of sentencing, with the placement being designed to allow
federal judges to participate without giving up their lifetime ap-
pointments. 5" In its brief, the Commission implicitly proposed a
different test: The power the independent agency is to exercise
should determine its placement. 157 Mistretta, along with the Com-
mission, argued that the Court was bound by the congressional
statement as to which branch the Commission belonged. 5 '
The Reagan administration pursued yet another tack, focusing
on the type of power that the Commission exercised. It asserted
that the Commission was characterized correctly as an indepen-
dent agency in the executive branch.'59 The government argued
that the task of "making more particular [Congress'] general deter-
minations regarding the appropriate punishments for crimes"160
was an executive function and that the grant of the authority to
the Commission was permissible because the structure, operation
and responsibilities of the Sentencing Commission are entirely
155. Legislators debated the composition and placement of the Commission and eventu-
ally compromised by placing the Commission in the judicial branch and allowing the Presi-
dent to appoint the commissioners. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)- (Supp. V 1987). Three of the seven
commissioners were to be federal judges whom the President selected from a list of six
judges recommended by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The President's ap-
pointment power was restricted by the advice and consent of the Senate, and his removal
power was limited. Id.
156. Mistretta, Brief of the United States Senate as Amicus Curiae on Cross Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.
157. The Commission posited:
Congress was acting on its "strong feeling that, even under this legislation, sen-
tencing should remain primarily a judicial function." The power to impose
punishment is a judicial power .... Congress thus properly concluded that,
historically, center of gravity of the sentencing power is located in the judicial
branch, and that responsibility for implementing the decision to create a new
system of determinate sentences should, accordingly, be centered there as well.
Mistretta, Brief of the United States Sentencing Commission As Amicus Curiae Support-
ing Affirmance.
158. The crux of the argument is that because Congress' statement of location has impli-
cations for the operation and control of the Commission and therefore has statutory signifi-
cance, it should have constitutional significance as well. Mistretta, Brief of Respondent-
Petitioner John M. Mistretta.
159. See Mistretta, Brief for the United States.
160. Id.
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consistent with the lawful exercise of that power." '' The govern-
ment urged the Court to look beyond the fact that Congress had
placed the Commission in the judicial branch and to base the
Court's determination instead on the powers of the Commission.
The government argued:
The Constitution .. .does not speak of "branches" at all, but
instead speaks of "power." If the Commission is exercising exec-
utive power, as we believe it is, the only question of constitu-
tional significance is whether the structure and function of the
Commission are consistent with the exercise of that power. The
designation of the Commission as an agency "in the judicial
branch" may be of symbolic significance and may even affect the
application of various other statutes to the Commission. But the
"judicial branch" designation standing alone, has no bearing on
whether the Sentencing Commission may constitutionally exer-
cise the power it has been assigned. 62
In Mistretta, the Court did not indicate whether one answers
the location question by focusing on who controls the agency or
commission exercising the power in question, the nature of the
power exercised, or Congress' statement of location. Although it
acknowledged that the Commission "does not exercise judicial
power," "is fully accountable to Congress" (unlike other judicial
bodies), and its members "are subject to the President's limited
powers of removal" (also unlike other judicial bodies), 63 the Court
drew the questionable conclusion that the Commission was prop-
erly considered in the judicial branch for the purposes of separa-
tion of powers analysis. One may assume the Court simply ratified
Congress' placement of the Commission in the judicial branch.'"
The Court's silence on the location issue is deafening. Its lack of
coherence on this issue particularly annoyed Justice Scalia who, as
a formalist, would "decide the question of which Branch an agency
belongs to on the basis of who controls its actions."'6 5 In its next
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Mistretta v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 665-66 (1989).
164. See id. at 680-82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Incidentally, whether the Court is still wedded to
the notion of branches or has adopted the government's proposed "powers" analysis is not
clear. See id. at 665-66.
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separation of powers opinion, however, the Court will probably
have to articulate more fully how to answer the location question
because a clear congressional statement such as that in Mistretta
is unusual.
The Court's answer to the location question could drastically af-
fect formalist analysis and, by extension, the prospects for revival
of the nondelegation doctrine. If the Court adopts Justice Scalia's
approach and focuses on who controls the agency, formalism re-
mains a viable tool for separation of powers analysis. If, however,
the Court focuses on the powers exercised by an agency in order to
classify it,16 a different conclusion results. Formalist analysis
would not work with this standard because the Court would be
asking essentially the same question twice: What type of power is
being exercised?1 7 The answers to the two-step formalist analysis
would be identical and every ruling would be for constitutionality.
The Court, therefore, would be limited to using functionalist anal-
ysis, under which the nondelegation doctrine would finally be
interred.
The muddled analysis in Mistretta betrays a results-oriented ap-
proach. The Court preferred preservation of the Commission. Had
the Court found the Commission unconstitutional, judges would
have had to resentence approximately 4,500 individuals. 68 Perhaps
to avoid such an administrative nightmare, the Court reached a
contrary result.
166. The government, the Senate and the Commission advocated this position in Mis-
tretta. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
167. Ironically, this fallacy is the inverse of Chief Justice Burger's Chadha analysis, as
some commentators have acknowledged. In Chadha, Burger answered the formalist question
of what power was being exercised by similarly circular reasoning, stating that" '[w]hen any
Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the Constitution has delegated to it.'"
Note, A Two-Tiered Theory, supra note 52, at 443 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950).
168. See Kamen, Court Backs Rules on Sentencing; Decision Removes Doubts on Valid-
ity of 1984 Reform Act, Wash. Post, Jan. 19, 1989, at Al, col. 6:
Of the nearly 40,000 federal defendants who were sentenced in the 12 months
after the guidelines went into effect Nov. 1, 1987, 5,651 committed crimes after
that date and could have been sentenced under the guidelines, according to the
commission. Of that number, only 1,187 were sentenced under the old system
.... In addition, some defendants have already completed their sentences
and others are likely to face stiffer sentences under the guidelines and are not
expected to appeal.
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In a recent speech before the American Bar Association, Profes-
sor William P. Murphy asserted that a results-oriented approach
permeated the term in which the Court decided Mistretta. Mur-
phy claimed:
The past term of Court gave the nation a stark and dramatic
demonstration that at the Supreme Court level law is the reflec-
tion of the personal predilections and subjective value judg-
ments of the Justices. Conservatives long accused a liberal Court
majority of reading its values into law. The charge was abso-
lutely correct. But the claim was that conservative Justices
would not "make" the law but simply "interpret" the law. The
verbal distinction between interpreting law and making law is
naive and the claim that conservatives would be different from
liberals was hypocritical. What conservatives really desired was
a Court majority whose judicial legislation would further a dif-
ferent set of values and interests. The desire has been achieved,
and what should have been known all along has now been pub-
licly demonstrated-conservative Justices are judicial activists
as fully as liberal Justices. 16 9
If Murphy is correct, Mistretta and Morrison reflect less a
change in the Court's separation of powers analysis than a re-
sponse to the justices' perceived exigencies of a particular situa-
tion.170 This explanation suggests that formalism and, thereby, the
nondelegation doctrine may not be on their last legs. Indeed, if the
169. W. Murphy, supra note 150.
170. The pursuit of a desired result, rather than scholarly dictates, also may have guided
the Court in Morrison. More was at stake in that case than just the outcome of independent
counsel Alexia Morrison's investigation. A finding that the independent counsel provision of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591-599 (Supp. V 1987), was uncon-
stitutional would have put in question the convictions of former White House aides Michael
Deaver and Lyn Nofziger, who were prosecuted by independent counsels Whitney North
Seymour, Jr., and James C. McKay, respectively. See Kamen, Supreme Court to Rule on
Independent Counsels; Minority Contracting Case Also Accepted, Wash. Post, Feb. 23,
1988, at A4, col. 1; Taylor, Jr., Justices to Decide Constitutionality of Special Prosecutor
Law, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1988, at D29, col. 2 (discussing the case's potential impact on the
Nofziger and Deaver convictions).
A further consideration was the pending Iran-Contra investigation, including its ironic
parallel to Watergate, see Mauro, Did Scalia Persuade Colleagues to Revisit Runyon?, MAN-
HArrAN LAWYER, May 17, 1988, at 12, and the possibility that a finding of unconstitutional-
ity in Morrison might interfere with such an investigation. The independent counsel provi-
sion was in fact the "key reform to emerge from the Watergate scandal." Denniston, Courtly
Manners, AMERICAN LAW., July/Aug. 1988, at 135.
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Court wishes to retain two different methods of separation of pow-
ers analysis with which it may gerrymander results on a case-by-
case basis, it must not only retain formalism, but also must answer
the location question by focusing on something other than the na-
ture of the power exercised.
Formalist opinions may again be on the horizon, and the location
question, when next answered by the Court, ought to focus on who
controls, not what power is exercised. As long as courts employ for-
malist analysis, the resurrection of the nondelegation doctrine is
feasible. The next section focuses on possible means to that end.
THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE SHOULD BE REVIVED
The Necessity
Simply stated, delegation is out of control. On virtually a daily
basis, Congress transfers lawmaking power in the guise of vague
delegations to agencies that "are now well beyond monitoring by
our political representatives, either in the White House or on Capi-
tol Hill." M The implications for the nation's governing apparatus,
in both institutional and practical terms, make compelling the case
for revival of the nondelegation doctrine. The Court's rejection of
the legislative veto, a significant check on the agencies, in INS v.
Chadha,72 illustrates further the doctrine's necessity. Until that
decision, the legislative veto had been, in Justice White's words,
"an important if not indispensable political invention that al-
low[ed] the President and Congress to. . .assure[] the accounta-
bility of independent regulatory agencies, and preserve[] Congress'
Although Attorney General Meese had given Lawrence Walsh, the independent counsel
investigating the Iran-Contra scandal, a parallel appointment as a Justice Department pros-
ecutor to prepare for the contingency of a finding of unconstitutionality in Morrison, "a
constitutional defect in the statute could have affected the early part of Mr. Walsh's investi-
gation-when he did not have the parallel appointment .... Such a constitutional taint,
said Professor Paul F. Rothstein of Georgetown University Law Center, could have affected
not only the early evidence-gathering but the entire investigation." Coyle, Full Speed
Ahead for D.C. Probes; Court Removes Constitutional Taint, Nat'l L. J., July 11, 1988, at 3,
col. 1. Although Walsh was appointed independent counsel on Dec. 19, 1986, his parallel
appointment was not made until Mar. 5, 1987. Independent Counsels: A Short History,
Wash. Post, June 30, 1938, at A22, col. 5.
171. Scalia, Legislative Veto, supra note 14, at 24.
172. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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control over lawmaking. '173 With that "post-legislation" check no
longer technically at its disposal, Congress must resort instead to a
"pre-legislation" check-specifically, narrow drafting of
delegations.7 4
At their inception, "federal regulatory agencies were romanti-
cally conceived as institutions headed by expert citizens who could
not be removed by the president and who could therefore exert
public power with speed and disinterest.' 7 5 In the New Deal era,
many believed that the institutional system of separate branches
"prevented the government from reacting flexibly and rapidly to
stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from fluc-
tuations in the unmanaged market . . . [and] created political
struggles that disabled officials in the executive branch from mak-
ing regulatory policies free of partisan pressure. "176
The agencies were supposed to circumvent these problems:
"[R]eformers believed that administrative officials would serve as
independent, self-starting, technically expert, and apolitical agents
of change.' 17 7 The end result, however, has proven far less satisfac-
tory than the agencies' architects envisioned. The agencies have
left suspect any claims of expertise,'7 8 independence, e or
efficiency. 8 0
The fundamental problem with administrative agencies is the
basic institutional changes that excessive delegations to the agen-
cies have wrought. Then-Professor Scalia accurately perceived:
The main problem is that the agencies have been assigned too
many tasks requiring judgments that are of an essentially politi-
173. Id. at 972-73 (White, J., dissenting).
174. Justice White criticized what he recognized as the inevitable consequence of the ma-
jority's decision, stating that "[w]hile Congress could write certain statutes with greater
specificity, it is unlikely that this is a realistic or even desirable substitute for the legislative
veto." Id. at 973 n.10 (White, J., dissenting).
175. Fein, Get Rid of Regulatory Agencies-They Aren't Independent and They're Un-
constitutional, Wash. Post, July 27, 1986, at D5, col. 4.
176. Sunstein, supra note 21, at 424; see Note, A Two-Tiered Theory, supra note 52, at
438.
177. Id. at 422.
178. See Lowi, supra note 15, at 304-05; Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at
23; Note, supra note 23, at 1769.
179. See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 26; Lowi, supra note 15, at 306;
Fein, supra note 175, at D5, col. 4.
180. See, e.g., Stewart, Beyond Delegation, supra note 15, at 324.
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cal nature and that ought to be made by our elected
representatives ...
.. .[T]he truth is that the bureaucracy is not unresponsive,
only unelected; that procedures are no substitute for the ballot
box; and that Congressional control is no longer possible."' 1
The American people have a right to expect that only those they
choose will enact the nation's legislation; that bureaucrats are exer-
cising such power is a distortion of the democratic underpinnings
of American government. 182 The Lockean contract the American
people forged with their government more than 200 years ago
should not be any less binding today:
The constitutional problem that underlies the current dissatis-
faction is that Congress has not fulfilled its constitutional re-
sponsibilities. Article I of the Constitution provides that "[a]l
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress"
The theoretical foundation of this basic concept of legislative
responsibility derives from John Locke's insistence that legisla-
tors cannot delegate their legislative authority. The legislature's
authority to delegate its lawmaking power is severely con-
strained not so much because of a fear of its possible misuse, but
because of a conviction that the people agreed to relinquish
their most important power only to representatives that they
alone have chosen. 83
181. Scalia, Legislative Veto, supra note 14, at 26.
182. But cf. Lowi, supra note 15, at 306-07 (lending credence to the argument that'law-
making by the agencies may ironically be more democratic than that by Congress because
the rulemaking process provides for easy access and participation by citizens); Marshall,
"Let Congress Do It". The Case For An Absolute Rule Of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MiCH.
L. REV. 177, 224 (1989) ("[Plart of the saving grace of a delegation to an agency whose
officials are answerable to the President is the indirect electoral accountability of these deci-
sionmakers.") (footnote omitted). To add insult to injury, "the Supreme Court has never
[even] offered a serious constitutional defense for the existence of 'independent agencies.'
... The Morrison Court did not address the constitutional issue directly, but the Court
clearly assumed the constitutionality of independent agencies." Note, supra note 99, at 208
(footnotes omitted).
183. Gellhorn, supra note 33, at 347-48 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
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The Proposed Modifications
The intelligible principle standard
Nondelegation is still a valid constitutional doctrine. Neither
Morrison nor Mistretta has repudiated it outright. In a constitu-
tional vacuum then, its deterrent capacity would continue to insure
that policy choices remained in Congress' hands. As a practical
matter, however, the Court cannot apply the doctrine strictly be-
cause of the absence of a justiciable standard and of any way of
defining an improper delegation of a policy choice.18 4 Hence, the
Court has effectively rendered this valid constitutional doctrine
useless.
When the Court cannot enforce a constitutional doctrine in a lit-
eral sense, however, it has an obligation to consider the doctrine's
purposes in an effort to at least satisfy the spirit of the doctrine. In
this instance, that purpose is accountability. Thus, although al-
lowing executive agencies to make Congress' policy choices violates
the nondelegation doctrine in its purest sense, such a delegation at
least partially satisfies the purpose of accountability. The executive
branch is, after all, also accountable to the people. The Court can
better rationalize its reluctance to enforce the doctrine in such
instances.
When, however, Congress leaves policy choices to independent
agencies, which are neither branches nor even participants in the
constitutionally mandated legislative process, no accountability ra-
tionale can explain the Court's reluctance to apply the nondeleg-
tion doctrine. Even worse are those agencies such as the Sentenc-
ing Commission that exercise only adjudicatory power because
they cannot be controlled indirectly by the executive branch, as
can an independent agency exercising all three powers.185 The sta-
184. Were the Court to apply the doctrine in the absence of such a standard, working
instead an ad hoc determination in each case, a formalist doctrine would ironically be trans-
lated into a functionalist tool.
185. The main argument in favor of independence for agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission is that such agencies perform adjudicatory functions that should not be con-
trolled by the Executive. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law and the Idea of
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 322, 330-33 (1989). According to this argument,
there are two ways the President (or Congress) could control adjudications in agencies exer-
cising adjudicatory, legislative and executive functions: directly or indirectly. Direct presi-
dential interference in an agency adjudication likely would be a violation of due process.
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tus of one power independent agencies places them to one end of
the continuum of accountability. In this zone, the Court's reluc-
tance to enforce the doctrine is not justified.
A scheme that recognizes a distinction between delegations to
accountable executive agencies and delegations to unaccountable
independent ones, limiting application of the doctrine to the latter,
silences critics who argue that a revival of the doctrine would nec-
essarily cripple the government. Such a limitation ensures that
only those delegations most offensive to the doctrine's purposes are
censured and the scope of those bodies most unaccountable is
impeded.
What remains is the task of constructing a justiciable standard
with which courts may enforce the doctrine in such limited scena-
rios. The "rules statute" versus "goals statute" distinction ad-
vanced by Professor Schoenbrod is offered here as a means of de-
termining which delegations pass the intelligible standard
threshold.188 A rules statute lays down a rule demarcating permis-
sible from impermissible conduct.187 A goals statute, on the other
hand, although in the form of a rule, in reality sets forth only
goals. 18 The latter would be an impermissible form of delegation
because it calls for policymaking via the use of discretion, rather
than mere interpretation.8 9 Professor Schoenbrod writes that
However, the President or Congress could influence an adjudication in a "three-power
agency" indirectly by exerting control over the agency's executive or legislative powers. Ef-
fectively, the President would hold the agency's non-adjudicatory power hostage, seeking as
ransom his desired adjudicatory result. It follows, then, that the fewer powers an agency
exercises, the less opportunity the political branches have to exert such control.
Put simply, the justification for agency independence is impotent when applied to agen-
cies that exercise only one power. If that power is adjudicatory, then due process prevents
congressional and executive interference and statutory "independence" is redundant. If,
however, the one-power agency exercises solely non-adjudicatory power, there is no justifica-
tion for independence; the agency should be accountable to a political branch. This is the
case with the Sentencing Commission, which is charged with creating legislation for Con-
gress. See Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
186. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine,
supra note 15.
187. See Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 15, at 359. An example of a rules
statute is one that prohibits the emission of a specific number of pounds of a given
pollutant.
188. Id. An example of a goals statute is one that prohibits the emission of more pollution
than the agency deems is reasonable.
189. Professor Schoenbrod explained:
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"[g]oals statutes frustrate judicial review and congressional electo-
ral accountability. They enable legislators to escape the difficult,
value-laden choices implicit in balancing competing policy goals
* * ,*[In contrast,] rules statutes make the legislative decisions
substantive and concrete by stating what people can or cannot do
in the statute."'190
Concededly, this scheme is susceptible to semantic manipula-
tion. For example, a delegation that "the EPA prohibit emission
levels that damage the public health" is an impermissible goals
statute in the guise of a permissible rules statute. When honestly
applied, however, the distinction between the two is apparent
enough to serve as a judicially manageable standard. With respect
to Congress, rules statutes are a type of permissible legislative del-
egation to which that body can limit itself.
Some argue that, in light of time and expertise deficiencies, Con-
gress has little choice but to issue broad delegations such as those
found in goals statutes.' 9 ' This argument relies on a number of er-
roneous presumptions. That Congress does not have the number of
in-house experts that an agency does, 92 for example, is an inade-
quate justification for the breadth of delegations today. Certainly,
Congress "can request data from agencies before legislating ....
In some situations, perhaps Congress should not wait for informa-
tion, but should acknowledge the uncertainties and make a deci-
sion on existing information and political pressures, rather than
burying the uncertainties and political pressures in agency deliber-
ations."19 3 Further, although the legislative process is notoriously
A rules statute requires the legislature to assume more responsibility and
hence to be more accountable for the bearing of that responsibility than does a
goals statute .... In a goals statute, the legislature does not go that far; it
indicates legislative hopes and requires a delegate to allocate rights and duties
corresponding to those hopes.
Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1254.
190. Id. at 1254-55.
191. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 7, at 119.
192. Commentators note, however, that "agency heads do not necessarily have more ex-
pertise than do members of Congress, particularly committee and subcommittee chairmen
and ranking minority members." Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, supra note 9, at 23.
193. Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine, supra note 15, at 1278.
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slow, the contention that the administrative process is any more
expedient has no merit.194
Finally, the established committee system that Congress has to
handle its relations with the agencies makes it entirely practicable
that Congress could do the work involved in lending some sub-
stance and clarity to its delegations. Indeed, in Mistretta, as an
example, Congress could just as easily have gained "sentencing ex-
pertise" by creating a commission to draft legislation that Congress
could pass by both houses and present to the President for signing.
Forcing Congress to act affirmatively to pass the guidelines would
have ensured that it was in fact the President and Congress who
had made the policy choices with respect to criminal punishment.
No doubt the sentencing guidelines would have been radically dif-
ferent had Congress and the President been forced to bear respon-
sibility for them. In terms of congressional politics, however, it was
much easier to sit back and allow the guidelines to become law
than to pass them affirmatively.
The oft-hailed "efficiency" argument in favor of delegations is,
at best, a guise to hide the truth that our elected officials simply do
not want to bear the brunt of public opinion for their public
choices.195 Throwing the work of thousands of bureaucrats on the
shoulders of 535 members of Congress, however, is not the solu-
tion. Rather, we recommend using bureaucratic expertise to draft
"legislation" that Congress must then pass, or requiring Congress
to pass, at a minimum, real standards that make the fundamental
policy choices and bind bureaucrats.
Mistretta is particularly disturbing as it insures that Congress
will continue to use the "one power" independent agency to make
its hard choices.1 96 This is imminently worse from a separation of
powers perspective than allowing a "three power" agency to do the
same thing. Congress and the President at least can exercise some
194. Id. at 1278. "Agencies have frequently delayed long past congressional deadlines for
promulgating regulations, often pleading lack of knowledge, resources, manpower and time.
Their decisions may also lack full consideration, especially given the pressures to which they
are subject." Id.
195. See supra note 63.
196. See Comment, supra note 7, at 141.
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control over even "independent" three power agencies. The same
cannot be said for a "junior-varsity Congress.' 197
The fundamental rights approach
Much of the discussion in this Note has focused on separation of
powers and nondelegation as they affect the branches of govern-
ment. Yet both doctrines have at their core a concern for more
than just horizontal, or institutional, relationships. The govern-
mental structure dictated by both doctrines exists for a purpose: to
protect individual liberty.198 Thus, individuals also have an interest
in separation of powers and nondelegation concerns, which we de-
fine as a vertical relationship. 9
Stated simply, the choice of which branch makes the final policy
decision affects the ultimate policy choice.200 From this assumption
197. Mistretta, 109 S. Ct. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
198. Justice Scalia recognized this purpose in his Morrison dissent. Morrison, 108 S. Ct.
at 2637; see Feigenbaum, The Preservation of Individual Liberty Through the Separation
of Powers and Federalism: Reflections on the Shaping of Constitutional Immorality, 37
EMORY L.J. 613, 614 (1988) (The framers' main objective in devising the separation of pow-
ers scheme "was that political power should not be able to prevail over individual rights,
that individual liberty should not be sacrificed for the convenience, jealousy, or self-interest
of government."); Comment, Separation of Powers and the Individual, 55 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 965, 978-79 (1989) ("The Framers of our Constitution adopted the system of separa-
tion of powers to increase governmental efficiency and protect liberty. Separation of powers
. . .protects liberty by requiring cooperation of the separate branches before the govern-
ment can act.").
199. The Court has alluded to this relationship, stating, for example, that:
Article III, §1 serves both to protect "the role of the independent judiciary
within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government," and to safeguard
litigants' "right to have claims decided before judges who are free from poten-
tial domination by other branches of government." ...Although our cases
have provided us with little occasion to discuss . . . this latter safeguard, our
prior discussions of Article III, §1's guarantee of an independent and impartial
adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of
the United States intimated that this guarantee serves to protect primarily
personal, rather than structural, interests.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (citations omitted).
200. This, in essence, is the premise behind public choice theory. Public choice theory
views statutes as the embodiment of compromises between legislators, including the possi-
bility of agreeing to be vague when specificity would undermine agreement. For a general
explanation of public choice theory, see Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of
Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982); see also Eskridge, Jr., Politics
Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74
VA. L. REV. 275 (1988).
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follows" the conclusion that when Congress delegates without mak-
ing fundamental policy choices, the body to which it delegates will
make them, and those policy choices likely will be different from
the ones Congress would have made. This premise gives govern-
mental structure and the nondelegation doctrine new importance,
for now separation of powers is not merely procedural, but sub-
stantive as well. Put differently, individuals have a right under the
Constitution to the policy choices that Congress would have made.
This principle alone, however, does not confer standing on all
citizens to challenge agency action on separation of powers or
nondelegation grounds. When fundamental policy choices that
Congress should make affect personal interests, the Court is remiss
in not analyzing the separation of powers and nondelegation issues
with some form of heightened scrutiny. 0 1 Such situations impli-
cate both the horizontal and vertical separation of powers
interests.
Justice Brennan accurately explained the personal interest in-
volved in delegation in United States v. Robel.0 2 Justice Brennan
conceded that "Congress ordinarily may delegate power under
broad standards, 203 and that "in conferring power upon an appro-
priate authority, [it is enough that] Congress indicate its general
policy, and act in terms or within a context which limits the power
conferred. '204 Nonetheless, he indicated that Congress' delegation
authority is more limited in areas that affect fundamental individ-
201. The court of appeals in Morrison recognized implicitly the need for some examina-
tion of the individual interest involved in a separation of powers dispute. In re Sealed Case,
838 F.2d 476, 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("It is not the quantity of cases or investigations with-
drawn from executive supervision that is important, for a qualitatively significant encroach-
ment upon the executive's control over even a single case may have a drastic impact on the
individual involved.").
202. 389 U.S. 258 (1967). In Robel, the defendant faced a charge of unlawful membership
in the Communist Party while employed at a defense facility. His nondelegation argument
was that
[b]ecause the [Subversive Activities Control Act] contains no meaningful stan-
dard by which the Secretary [of the Interior] is to govern his designations...
the "defense facility" formulation is constitutionally insufficient to mark "the
field within which the [Secretary] is to act so that it may be known whether he
has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will."
Id. at 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425
(1944)).
203. Id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 274-75 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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ual liberties because "the numerous deficiencies connected with
vague legislative directives, whether to a legislative committee, to
an executive officer, to a judge and jury, or to private persons, are
far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental
rights are at stake.'20 5 Legislative judgments are especially neces-
sary in areas affecting personal liberty,2 °6 and when Congress
wishes to infringe on constitutionally protected interests, it may do
so only by passing legislation.2 °7
Professor Donald A. Dripps also recognized the nondelegation
doctrine's role as a protector of individual rights and suggested
that there is a strong connection between the nondelegation doc-
trine and procedural due process cases.2 08 Dripps believes that pro-
cedural due process cases have been a poor enforcement tool for
205. Id. at 275 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Justice
Brennan also reiterated the need for Congress to make fundamental policy choices in such
cases, explaining:
Formulation of policy is a legislature's primary responsibility, entrusted to it
by the electorate, and to the extent Congress delegates authority under indefi-
nite standards, this policy-making function is passed on to other agencies,
often not answerable or responsive in the same degree to the people.
"[S]tandards of permissible statutory vagueness are strict . . ." in protected
areas. "Without explicit action by lawmakers, decisions of great constitutional
import and effect would be relegated by default to administrators who, under
our system of government, are not endowed with authority to decide them."
Id. at 276 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 507 (1959)).
206. Justice Brennan explained:
The need for a legislative judgment is especially acute here, since it is impera-
tive when liberty and the exercise of fundamental freedoms are involved that
constitutional rights not be unduly infringed. . . . [Congressional determina-
tions] "must be made explicitly not only to assure that individuals are not
deprived of cherished rights under procedures not already authorized . . . but
also because explicit action, especially in areas of doubtful constitutionality,
requires careful and purposeful consideration by those responsible for enacting
and implementing our laws."
Id. at 277 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
207. See United States v. Grimadd, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
208. Dripps, supra note 63, at 659 (citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532 (1985)); see Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982); Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480 (1980); Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55 (1979); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976);
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416
U.S. 134 (1974); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972); Bell v. Burnson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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what are actually individual interests in nondelegation. °9 The con-
nection between the two doctrines rests in a constitutional require-
ment that Congress define federal policy.210 According to Dripps,
the intelligible principle requirement used by the Court in delega-
tion cases is a recognized constitutional principle even if it has
been rendered effectively inchoate. 21' The procedural due process
cases, to the contrary, lack a "legitimate predicate" in recognized
rules of constitutional law.212 Dripps suggests that courts should
treat these cases as nondelegation cases, varying the level of scru-
tiny according to the seriousness of the right involved. He explains:
The nature of the underlying right will still affect the analysis
by determining the clarity of congressional policy required
under the non-delegation doctrine. A relatively vague delegation
may withstand scrutiny if the power delegated governs commer-
cial activity. This is not to disparage property rights but only to
admit their secondary importance to rights to life and liberty.
The hierarchy of judicial value, with the exercise of political
freedoms and the maintenance of life itself at the apex, will ap-
pear in delegation cases just as it has in due process cases.
The difference under my proposal would be that courts would
measure the sufficiency of legislative procedures against the goal
of non-delegation, rather than against the goal of protecting
some other interest.
213
Professor Dripps is not the only commentator to note the con-
nection between due process and nondelegation. Numerous schol-
ars have noted that Chadha appears to be a due process case in
separation of powers clothing.214 As Paul Verkuil has explained:
What was offensive about Chadha's treatment by (one house of)
Congress was that he was, by all appearances, arbitrarily singled
out for harsh treatment. . . In this setting, when Congress acts
adversely upon individuals without explanation, due process and
209. Dripps, supra note 63, at 659.
210. Id. at 670.
211. Id. at 676.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 681.
214. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, supra note 198, at 620; Verkuil, supra note 185, at 312; Com-
ment, supra note 198, at 980-81.
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bill of attainder concerns mesh to form a reinforcing rationale
for judicial intervention.215
Indeed, Verkuil makes a compelling argument that due process
concerns explain an overwhelming number of the Court's separa-
tion of powers and nondelegation decisions.""' However, Verkuil,
unlike Dripps, does not argue for a reinvigorated nondelegation
doctrine. Rather, Verkuil believes that due process and bill of at-
tainder analysis can take the place of separation of powers cases
that focus on individual interests.2 17
When Congress delegates authority, as it did to the United
States Sentencing Commission in Mistretta, it often seeks to re-
duce the political costs of decisionmaking. 2 s Yet accountability is
the goal of the nondelegation doctrine. 9 When Congress must
make fundamental policy choices, accountability is enhanced, and
the work product is changed.220 Courts have recognized an individ-
ual interest in accountability when "administrative" action threat-
ens liberty interests, although some describe it as a due process
right.221
215. Verkuil, supra note 185, at 312-13.
216. See id.; see also Pierce, Jr., Separation of Powers and the Limits of Independence,
30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 365, 365-66 (1989).
217. Verkuil, supra note 185, at 320, 341.
218. See supra note 63.
219. Brian Koukoutchos has postulated that Justice Scalia premised his concerns with
individual rights in Morrison on accountability. Koukoutchos asserts, however, that the
President is accountable for the actions of a special prosecutor because of the "for cause"
removal provision. Koukoutchos, Constitutional Kinetics: The Independent Counsel Case
and the Separation of Powers, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 635, 714-15 (1988). This alleged
check notwithstanding, numerous other dangers relating to the independent counsel argue
against such a position. For a succinct exposition of such dangers, see Comment, supra note
198, at 990-91.
220. As Professor Bruff has noted, "Procedural formality not only conforms congressional
power to accountability; it also influences the congressional product. The Constitution's pro-
cedural requisites for legislation ameliorate the effects of faction and localized constituen-
cies, and foster policies that advances the public interest." Bruff, supra note 19, at 508.
221. In a decision overruled by Mistretta, a district court reasoned:
[W]hen a definite sentence is not statutorily mandated, a defendant being de-
prived of his liberty pursuant to a statute which sets a sentencing range is
constitutionally entitled to an articulated exercise of discretion by the judge
before whom he appears rather than to the mechanical application of formulae
adopted by non-constitutional commissioners invisible to him and to the gen-
eral public. The essence of due process is accountability, reason and a fair
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The problem with Verkuil's approach-applying due process
analysis instead of separation of powers or nondelegation analysis
to protect individual rights-is that it does not go far enough in
protecting individual rights. Verkuil recognizes that there is a
problem with congressional delegation of legislative authority.222
But due process analysis does not solve the problem in the difficult
cases. It might protect the Chadhas of the world, but what about
the Mistrettas?
Professor Pierce accurately described the state of due process ju-
risprudence in his critique of Verkuil's approach: "[P]rocedural
due process protects only individuals or small numbers of individu-
als from arbitrary government actions that single them out for ad-
verse action. In contrast, when a government action affects a large
number of people, their recourse is through the political pro-
cess." 223 Pierce is right, of course, in his interpretation of the
Court's due process jurisprudence. When fundamental policy
choices regarding individual liberties are made by an unaccounta-
ble body rather than by passing legislation and presenting it to the
President, individuals deserve some protection. Due process analy-
sis, as Pierce demonstrates, simply does not provide it.
In applying Dripps' theory to Mistretta, one must first note that
the delegation to the Commission necessarily implicated the lib-
erty interests of defendants convicted of crimes. Congress thus del-
egated the authority to make fundamental policy choices.224 Be-
opportunity to be heard. These cannot be replaced by any administrative code,
however extensively considered or precisely drawn.
United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D. Md. 1988) (emphasis added), rev'd,
876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989). Judge Bork echoed the importance of accountability, stating,
"The Constitution preserves our liberties by providing that all of those given the authority
to make policy are directly accountable to the people through regular elections." R. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AmERICA 4-5 (1990).
222. Verkuil, supra note 185, at 318.
223. Pierce, Jr., supra note 216, at 367. Pierce concludes that a procedural due process
argument would fail in Mistretta for precisely this reason. Pierce, Jr., supra note 104, at 36.
224. The Commission has complete discretion in the imposition of "sentences of proba-
tion, a fine, or imprisonment" or "other authorized sanctions" for all federal offenses. 28
U.S.C. § 994(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1987). Although it most likely will not, the Commission
theoretically could promulgate guidelines calling for life imprisonment without parole for all
federal offenses. More likely to be exercised, and more politically oriented, is its authority to
implement the death penalty for certain federal offenses. Yet another policy choice, and
within its discretion, is the Commission's decision to establish fines for all non-indigent de-
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cause those policy choices probably are different from those that
the legislative process would have reached,225 and because the per-
sonal interests at stake rank among the highest of judicial values,
the delegation to the Commission should have received closer
scrutiny.
Liberty interests will not be implicated in all separation of pow-
ers cases. Such an interest is difficult to conceive in Bowsher v.
Synar,226 for instance. There, the dispute was on a purely horizon-
tal level.227 However, when liberty interests are implicated, the
Court must find a way to address the vertical relationship as well.
Perhaps in cases in which alternative constitutional guarantees
(i.e. due process and bill of attainder clauses) can protect liberty
interests, those guarantees should be used as Verkuil advocates. 228
But in cases in which liberty interests are implicated and no other
constitutional guarantee applies, the Court should apply separa-
tion of powers and nondelegation analysis rigorously.
This rigorous application should take the form of strict scru-
tiny.229 Under such a test the Court should inquire first into
whether government structured the law the way it has because of a
compelling government interest. Reasons of efficiency would work
fendants convicted of federal offenses. The Commission may also consider criminal punish-
ment for corporations.
225. As Judge Bork explained:
[Q]uestions of governmental structure, competence, and authority are, of
course, closely related to the resolution of the Madisonian dilemma ....
When the President and Congress come into a conflict requiring resolution by
the Court. . . [i]t matters greatly to the individual. . . which arm of govern-
ment has legitimate authority in a field that affects him. It matters not only in
terms of the result that one branch of government ordains but, since different
governmental bodies have constituencies of different sizes and compositions, it
matters to the citizen's chances of participating in decisionmaking.
R. BORK, supra note 221, at 140.
226. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
227. Professor Paul Gerwitz, however, found it troubling that the Court in Bowsher did
not address the real issue: whether Congress may bind "itself with a series of mechanical
across-the-board spending cuts rather than making considered value choices on an ongoing
basis. . . ." Gerwitz, Realism in Separation of Powers Thinking, 30 WA. & MARY L. REv.
343, 349 (1989).
228. See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
229. For a general discussion of strict scrutiny in the equal protection/due process con-
text, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-31 (3d ed. 1986) (cit-
ing United States v. Carolene Product Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1958)).
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here. Second, the Court should determine if Congress could have
achieved its purpose through "less violative means." In applica-
tion, this second prong would consider the accountability purpose
of separation of powers and the right of the people to have Con-
gress and the President make fundamental policy choices. 30
In the Mistretta scenario, the test would apply as follows: Cer-
tainly, Congress' purposes of gaining the input of those with sen-
tencing expertise and increasing congressional efficiency are legiti-
mate and would pass the first prong. The Commission would fail
under the second prong, however. The sentencing guidelines be-
came law without congressional or executive approval of the funda-
mental policy choices contained therein. Alternative means to
achieve Congress' purposes did exist. First, Congress could have
established the Commission in the executive branch under legisla-
tion in which Congress and the President made the fundamental
policy choices regarding sentencing.23' Second, Congress easily
could have required the Commission to send its proposed Guide-
lines to Congress as a legislative proposal upon which both houses
and the President would be required to act affirmatively. Thus, a
virtually standardless delegation that might normally pass the
Court's "rational basis" separation of powers review-a review that
focuses solely on institutional, horizontal relationships-would fail
under a "strict scrutiny" separation of powers review that consid-
ers the primary vertical concern: accountability for fundamental
policy choices affecting liberty interests.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution was not born of a hurried or whimsical under-
taking. Its provisions evidenced the long and careful deliberations
of the founding fathers. The wisdom of those leaders cannot be
230. The authors reiterate what they believe to be a relatively uncontroversial proposi-
tion: that the policy choices made by politically accountable bodies will differ from those
made by unaccountable bodies. More controversial is whether the choices made by unac-
countable bodies are better than those made by accountable bodies.
231. For example, Congress could have decided that the death penalty should not be in-
cluded as a sentencing option, that all violent offenders should go to jail or that corporate
crimes should be punishable by imprisonment of officers as well as fines. It then could have
left it to the executive branch's Commission to fill in the details regarding mitigating factors
and so on.
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readily discarded. Essentially, however, that is what Congress and
the courts have done in their emasculation of the nondelegation
doctrine during the past fifty years. The resulting impact on both
the institutional workings of the American Government and the
personal liberty interests of its citizens has been profound. Indeed,
in abandoning the doctrine, Congress and the courts have ignored
this society's democratic underpinning-the notion that only those
accountable to the people shall have the authority to create legisla-
tion binding on its citizens. If "taxation without representation"
proved a mighty slogan for the colonists, then "legislation without
represelitation" should have no less impact today. A minor admin-
istrative revolution in the form of the nondelegation doctrine's re-
vival on the terms stated herein is appropriate if the label "democ-
racy" is to be more than just a pretense.
Lisa A. Cahill
J. Russell Jackson
